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THE SECOND CIRCUIT UPHOLDS WASTE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WAKE OF
CARBONE v. CLARKSTOWN: THE DECISIONS
IN USA RECYCLING, INC. v. TOWN OF
BABYLON AND SSC CORP. v. SMITHTOWN
Colin A. Fieman*
Introduction
In C. & A. Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that a Clarkstown, New York ordinance
which controlled the flow of "solid waste" (i.e. garbage) within the
town violated the "dormant" commerce clause of the federal con-
stitution.2 Since then, trash haulers, landfill operators and inter-
state transportation companies have challenged waste management
systems across the country, including those located on Long Island
and in New York's Onondaga, Oneida and Herkimer counties,
claiming that the costs and restrictions imposed by the systems bur-
den interstate commerce. Because the decision in Carbone was
* B.A., Haverford College, 1986; J.D., Columbia University School of Law,
1990. The author is a member of the litigation department of the Syracuse law firm of
Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen, Lawler & Burstein, P.C.
1. - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994).
2. The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To regu-
late Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes ... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[a]lthough the Clause thus speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the
Court has long recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers
against interstate trade." Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35
(1980) (citations omitted). Thus, the commerce clause not only authorizes congres-
sional action but has a "dormant" aspect which restricts permissible state regulation
even in the absence of conflicting federal regulation. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 326 (1979).
3. Raite Rubbish Removal Corp. v. Onondaga County, et al., No. 94-CV-1630
(N.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 19, 1994); United Haulers Ass'n, Inc., et al. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., No. 95-CV-0516 (N.D.N.Y. filed April 14, 1995). See also:
Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic
County, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995); National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Williams,
877 F. Supp. 1367 (D.Minn. 1995); Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Ass'n v.
Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877 F. Supp. 935 (M.D.Pa. 1994).
Legislation that has been languishing in Congress for at least a year would provide
retroactive congressional authorization for existing local flow control systems (with
some exceptions) and preempt future commerce clause challenges to those systems
based on the Carbone decision. See S. 534, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 1180,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). As of this writing, however, the latest attempt by Con-
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cast in unusually broad terms, efforts by many communities to de-
vise safe and practical waste management systems and enormous
public investments in waste processing facilities are now highly vul-
nerable to commerce clause challenges.4
In two recent decisions, however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit construed Carbone narrowly and up-
held two Long Island municipal flow control systems. In USA
Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon5 and SSC Corp. v. Smithtown,6
the Second Circuit distinguished the Long Island systems from the
facts in Carbone and, in doing this, largely reconciled Carbone with
the Supreme Court's earlier commerce clause jurisprudence. The
Babylon and Smithtown decisions may prove to provide a long-
term blueprint for building waste management systems which will
pass constitutional muster. At the very least, the decisions have
already had a significant impact on recent litigation involving other
New York waste management systems.7
Part I of this Article analyzes the Supreme Court's holding in
Carbone and the issues left unresolved by the decision. Part II dis-
cusses how the Second Circuit addressed the constitutionality of
the waste management systems at issue in Babylon and Smithtown
gress to pass flow control legislation has failed and the ultimate enactment of federal
flow control authorization is very uncertain. See House Dumps Trash-Control Bill,
SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Feb. 1, 1996, at B3.
4. See Petersen & Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the Post-
Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361 (1995). As the Second Circuit summa-
rized in SSC Corp. v. Smithtown:
Not long ago, municipalities took out the trash simply by hauling it to a local
dump. But as landfills have reached the bursting point, and as environmen-
tal regulations have burgeoned, local governments have been forced to make
significant investments and become more innovative in safely and legally dis-
posing of trash. These investments and innovations include the multifarious
transfer stations, recycling centers, and incinerators that have mushroomed
through the land in the past decade.
66 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1995). Whatever one's opinion of the choices a particular
community has made (for example, the wisdom of using incinerators as an alternative
to land filling is hotly debated), there can be no doubt that states and municipalities
can no longer rely on indiscriminate dumping, if only because of potential liability.
See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6941 et seq.
5. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
6. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 911 (1996).
7. In November, 1995, Raite Rubbish Removal Corp. v. Onondaga County et al.,
No. 94-CV-1630 (N.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 19, 1994), a case involving a commerce clause
challenge to a waste management system centered in Syracuse, New York, was settled
when the plaintiff entered into a stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice. The
Babylon and Smithtown decisions were cited in the stipulation as one of the reasons
for the plaintiff's decision to end the litigation.
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in light of the Carbone decision and traditional commerce clause
jurisprudence. Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the
Second Circuit's decisions for other waste management systems.
This Article concludes that although the Second Circuit has made
considerable progress in clarifying the law in this area, it has left
questions about the constitutionality of flow control unanswered.
I. The Supreme Court's Decision in Carbone v. Clarkstown
In Carbone, the Town of Clarkstown had arranged for a private
contractor to construct a "transfer station," or trash sorting and
processing facility, at a cost to the contractor of approximately $1.4
million.8 In exchange for paying for the station's construction,
Clarkstown gave the contractor permission to operate the facility
for five years.9 The town guaranteed that it would provide a mini-
mum of 120,000 tons per year for processing at a "tipping fee" of
$81 per ton.10 The town further guaranteed that it would compen-
sate the contractor for any shortfall in the guaranteed tonnage."
At the end of five years, Clarkstown had the option of purchasing
the station for one dollar. 12
The success of the town's financing scheme depended upon its
ability to meet the minimum guaranteed tonnage, a problem, the
Supreme Court noted, "compounded by the fact that the tipping
fee of $81 per ton exceeded the disposal cost of unsorted solid
waste on the private market.' 1 3 In response, the town passed an
ordinance requiring delivery of all non-hazardous solid waste
within its borders to the new transfer station.' 4 The ordinance pre-
scribed fines and even imprisonment for noncompliance.' 5
The lead plaintiff in the case, C & A Carbone, Inc., operated a
recycling center in Clarkstown and processed waste which
originated in both Clarkstown and outside New York State.' 6 Car-
bone claimed that by requiring him to send the non-recyclable por-
8. 114 S.Ct. at 1680.
9. Id.
10. Id. In the waste management industry, a "tipping fee" is the fee charged by a
waste processing facility to waste haulers for unloading waste at the facility. The
phrase refers to the fact that most garbage is unloaded from collection trucks by tip-
ping the back of the truck over a landfill or unloading pit.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14.. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1680.
15. See id. at 1687.
16. Id. at 1680-81.
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tion of the waste he processed to the town's chosen facility, the
town's ordinance "drives up the cost for out-of-state interests to
dispose of their solid waste."' 7 In addition, with respect to waste
which originated in Clarkstown, Carbone claimed the ordinance
prevented everyone but the "favored local operator" from process-
ing waste, thereby depriving "out-of-state businesses of access to a
local market."' 8
The Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional. 9 As a
general matter, governmental action falls within the purview of the
commerce clause if it burdens or impedes the free flow of interstate
commerce.20 Clarkstown's ordinance impeded interstate com-
merce because it effectively hoarded local resources, waste process-
ing and disposal services, by exclusively allocating the provision of
those services to a local operator.2'
The Court supported its decision by citing its long-standing prin-
ciple that regulations which discriminate against interstate com-
merce are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity. '22 The
fact that both local waste processors (other than the favored opera-
tor) and out-of-state businesses were excluded from the market did
not decrease the burden the town had placed on interstate com-
merce. 23 If a regulation is discriminatory either on its face or in
effect, it will pass constitutional muster only if the regulator can
17. Id. at 1681.
18. Id. While this latter claim was an important factor in the Court's decision, it is
not clear how Carbone had standing to assert it. Certainly, Carbone had standing to
raise a commerce clause claim if it could show that it lost out-of-state customers as a
result of inflated disposal costs arising from Clarkstown's ordinance which rendered
Carbone less competitive with processing facilities elsewhere. It is not clear, how-
ever, how Carbone could rely on the claim that out-of-state processors were denied
access to the local market, since it was a local operation and was not entitled to assert
the rights of third parties or generalized grievances. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
19. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1684.
20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
21. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1682.
22. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that state
law banning importation of out-of-state waste violated commerce clause). The Court
has defined "discrimination" for commerce clause purposes as "differential treatment
of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens
the latter." Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't. of Environmental Quality, - U.S.
-, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994).
23. Id. In this regard, the Court referred to its decision in Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which it held unconstitutional a city ordinance re-
quiring all milk sold in the city to be pasteurized within five miles of the city limits.
There, the Court had found that it was "immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside
the Madison area is subjected to the same proscription as that moving in interstate
commerce." Id. at 354 n.4.
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demonstrate under rigorous scrutiny that there are no other means
for achieving the legitimate local interest.24 Clarkstown's avowed
purpose for establishing flow control was to ensure that waste
within its borders was "made safe" before it entered the stream of
commerce.2 5 The Court, however, postulated that "any number of
nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing health and environ-
mental problems," such as uniform safety regulations, were avail-
able to the town.26 The town also advanced the interest it had in
using flow control to finance a new transfer station that would ulti-
mately belong to the town, but the Court concluded that "revenue
generation is not a local interest that can justify discrimination
against interstate commerce. '27
At first glance, the decision in Carbone may seem unremarkable,
but the Court's analysis of the paltry record on appeal raises more
issues than it resolves. The first of these issues is whether the ma-
jority concluded that Clarkstown's designated transfer station was
a purely private facility and, if it did, whether this was the primary
reason Clarkstown's ordinance was discriminatory. The majority
stated that Clarkstown's ordinance was "just one more instance of
local processing requirements that we have long held invalid" be-
cause they hoard a resource "for the benefit of local businesses. "28
Yet, as Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, the "one proprietor is
essentially an agent of the municipal government, which (unlike
Carbone or other private trash processors), must ensure the re-
moval of waste according to acceptable standards of public
health. "29
24. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (holding that the state's ban on the
import of bait fish was permissible because there was no non-discriminatory alterna-
tive for ensuring that local fish stock would not be infected by harmful parasite). In
Taylor, the Court stated that a discriminatory regulation may be permissible if it
serves a legitimate local purpose and "this purpose could not be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means." Id. (emphasis added). In Carbone, however, the
Court cited Taylor for the proposition that a discriminatory measure was invalid un-
less "the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other
means to advance a legitimate local interest." Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1683 (emphasis
added).
25. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1681.
26. Id. at 1683.
27. Id. at 1684. In the Court's opinion, the town could have resorted to taxes or
municipal bonds to finance its project, a point which was particularly significant in the
Second Circuit's commerce clause analysis. See infra notes 37-41, 64 and accompany-
ing text.
28. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1682.
29. Id. at 1695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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As Justice Souter suggests, unlike cases where a local processing
requirement is enacted simply to profit local businesses, Clarks-
town's ordinance served an essential municipal function.30 More-
over, as the Second Circuit noted in Babylon, nothing of obvious
constitutional significance turns on whether a traditional municipal
service is performed by the municipality itself or by its agent, so
long as locals and non-locals are subject to the same regulation. 31
If this is true, Clarkstown's ordinance is not as obviously a protec-
tionist processing requirement as the majority in Carbone asserted.
By failing to address the possible differences between Clarkstown's
ordinance and purely protectionist regulation, the majority opinion
suggests that any local regulatory scheme which limits waste
processing or disposal options effectively "hoards" a local resource
and therefore burdens interstate commerce.
The majority's rationale for concluding that Clarkstown's
method of financing the new transfer station was impermissible is
also unclear. The majority stated that "having elected to use the
open market to earn revenues for its project, the town may not
employ discriminatory regulation to give that project an advantage
over rival businesses from out of state. ' 32 In other words, even if
the transfer station served a public purpose, the town could not
regulate the market in a manner which inequitably redistributed
some of the cost of that facility to non-local businesses. It is not at
all clear, however, that the regulation had that effect. Common
sense suggests that the bulk of Clarkstown's waste processing cost
increases would be borne by Clarkstown waste generators, who
would ultimately absorb costs passed on to them by haulers. More-
over, the commerce clause is not necessarily violated if out-of-state
businesses which choose to dispose of waste in Clarkstown are re-
quired to pay increased costs, provided local residents and busi-
nesses pay the same heightened cost. After all, the commerce
clause does not protect particular businesses from regulation, only
from protectionist regulation.3 3 At the very least, the Carbone ma-
30. In contrast, the majority cited cases where the regulations at issue were plainly
designed to benefit local business interests. Id. at 1682. The Court cited: Minnesota
v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (striking down requirement that meat sold in state be
examined by state inspectors); South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down Alaska regulation requiring timber cut on state land
to be processed in Alaska).
31. USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
32. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1684.
33. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (the com-
merce clause is not violated by regulations which do not create barriers against inter-
WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
jority's failure to fully explicate the interstate burdens and discrimi-
natory cost allocation which it perceived in the Clarkstown system
invites confusion about the intended scope of its decision.
II. The Second Circuit's Application of Carbone
A. USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon
The Second Circuit confronted complex factual questions in
Babylon34 and Smithtown35 which were complicated by the unset-
tled constitutional issues. In Babylon, the town had constructed a
trash incinerator as the centerpiece of its local waste management
system.36 Taxes and bonds financed the construction of the inciner-
ator.37 The incinerator itself was owned by the town's develop-
ment agency and leased to a private operator, to which the town
paid a service fee for running the facility.38 To ensure the financial
viability of the incinerator, the town needed to deliver a minimum
of 225,000 tons of garbage to it each year.39 To do this, Babylon
created improvement districts and prohibited individual businesses
from hiring garbage haulers.40 At the same time, the town levied a
$1500 "flat tax" on commercial property, plus a "user fee" for each
cubic yard of garbage generated on each parcel above a fixed base
amount.4 1 The town then solicited bids from both local and out-of-
state haulers to collect non-recyclable commercial waste and ulti-
mately awarded its commercial waste hauling contract to a local
company, Babylon Source Separation Commercial, Inc.
("BSSCI").4 1 The town licensed BSSCI to dispose of 96,000 tons of
waste per year at the incinerator for free, and required it to pay a
tipping fee set by the town for any waste above that amount.4 3
state dealers, prohibit the flow of interstate goods, "or distinguish between in-state
and out-of-state companies").
34. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
35. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
36. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1276.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1277.
39. Id. at 1278.
40. Id The Second Circuit noted that the town's residential waste districts were
established pursuant to New York Town Law § 54 (suburban town "special improve-
ments") and § 198 ("powers of town boards with respect to improvement districts").
Id. at 1279 n.7. For reasons which are not clear, however, only the town's commercial
districts were challenged by the plaintiffs and the court did not comment on the legal
underpinnings for the commercial districts. Id. at 1278 n.7.
41. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1276.
42. Id. at 1277.
43. Id. at 1279.
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A number of plaintiffs challenged this waste management sys-
tem, including local waste collection companies, an interstate waste
transport company, and an out-of-state disposal facility." The
plaintiffs primarily claimed that, like the "favored status" bestowed
on the transfer station operator in Carbone, Babylon had discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce by awarding exclusive collection
rights to BSSCI.45
The Second Circuit disagreed. At the outset, the court stated
that it:
reject[s] the plaintiffs' contention that the Carbone decision
fashioned from the 'dormant' Commerce Clause a new, and un-
precedentedly sweeping, limitation on local government author-
ity to provide basic sanitation services to local residents and
businesses, on an exclusive basis and financed by tax dollars.46
With this introduction, the court first addressed whether Babylon's
system constituted regulation at all. The town had argued that its
system was not subject to commerce clause scrutiny because it was
purchasing collection services, thus acting as a market participant
and not a market regulator.47 Pursuant to the "market participant
doctrine," a state or municipality which purchases or sells goods or
services can buy and sell on the same terms that a private business
can, including selecting its business partners and dictating the man-
ner in which its contracts are met.48 While these terms may pre-
vent out-of-state companies from qualifying for municipal projects
or fully participating in the local market, they do not violate the
commerce clause because "[n]othing in the purpose animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State [or local government], in the
44. Id. at 1279-80. The case was decided on appeal from an order granting the
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. The district court was evidently so persuaded that
Carbone had precluded municipal flow control that it granted the injunction even
though it had found that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm from that
control. Id.
45. Id. at 1279.
46. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1276.
47. Id. at 1282.
48. For example, the Supreme Court held in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employees, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), that Boston could require that
half of the work force on construction projects funded by the city consist of Boston
residents. See also: South Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (Alaska,
although participating in market to sell timber, could not impose requirements on
"downstream" timber processing market); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
(state could confine sale of cement from state owned plant to state residents); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state could subsidize recycling of in-
state abandoned cars as participant in scrap metal market).
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absence of congressional action, from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others. 49
The Babylon court found that the town had exercised regulatory
powers which were unavailable to an ordinary participant in the
market by denying licenses to all garbage haulers but the one hired
by the town, and penalizing haulers who collect garbage without a
license.5 0 But, while Babylon was acting as a market regulator, the
court went on to hold that its regulation was not discriminatory. 1
In doing this, the court contrasted the Babylon transfer station with
that in Carbone. While Carbone involved a private operation
whose elevated costs were borne by the businesses required to
purchase its services,5 Babylon was not merely requiring haulers
to buy services from a local facility, but instead, eliminating the
local garbage collection market entirely and substituting a munici-
pal system funded by assessments and taxes. 3 The Second Circuit
concluded that although a regulation that benefits some trash
processors and burdens others may violate the commerce clause, a
regulation that drives private processors out of the market entirely
does not violate the commerce clause, provided local and out-of-
state businesses are equally excluded. 4 While the latter is more
severe, its severity is uniform.
The case was complicated by the fact that after Babylon "elimi-
nated" the local collection market, it awarded an exclusive collec-
tion contract to BSSCI, a local operator.5 At this juncture,
however, Babylon was acting as a market participant and not as a
market regulator. 6 While the town had acted as a regulator at the
outset when it passed its licensing provisions, its status changed to
that of a market participant when it purchased collection services
for its new garbage district.5 7
49. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). See also Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state was entitled to favor its own citizens in selling
cement manufactured at state-owned factory).
50. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1282-83.
51. Id. at 1284.
52. Id. at 1283.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1284-85.
55. Id at 1287.
56. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1287.
57. When acting as market participant, the town could either provide trash collec-
tion itself or purchase the service from a private contractor on any terms it chose. Id.
at 1288. At one point, the court noted that Babylon had used an open bidding process
to select its contractor and that it had not based its decision on geographical distinc-
tions, thereby suggesting that even as a market participant a municipality should
award its contracts on a non-discriminatory basis. Id. at 1290. The court had already
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In short, the court determined that Babylon's waste management
system was nondiscriminatory because the town had treated all
haulers equally by eliminating independent collection in its new
garbage district and by financing the collection system with munici-
pal funds rather than "forced business transaction[s]. ' 58 As a re-
sult, Babylon did not have to meet the strict scrutiny standard
which the Supreme Court applied in Carbone. Instead, Babylon
only had to show that its system "regulates even-handedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental . . . ." Under this analysis, a court
will uphold a regulation unless the burdens are "clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. ' 60 Noting that Congress
has recognized that "local governments have historically borne pri-
mary responsibility for the safe and reliable disposal of waste, '61
and that the Supreme Court has found that trash collection is a
"core function of local government in the United States, '62 the
Second Circuit found that the balance weighed in the town's favor.
B. SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown
In Smithtown,63 the Second Circuit was presented with a some-
what different set of facts. Like Babylon, Smithtown had an incin-
erator but, in this case, a private company formally owned and
operated the facility.64 Smithtown had implemented two measures
to ensure delivery of local waste to the incinerator. First, it enacted
an ordinance that required all local waste generators and collectors
concluded, however, that when a municipality participates in the market nothing
"precludes a local government from hiring a local company precisely because it is
local." Id at 1289.
58. Id. at 1283.
59. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
60. Babylon, 66 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
61. Id. at 1293 (citing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 1002(a)(4)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988)).
62. Id. at 1285. The court cited California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905), and Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905). While
those cases arose from takings and due process challenges to city ordinances which
awarded exclusive contracts to private "scavenger" firms, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the deference afforded by the Supreme Court to essential municipal serv-
ices was no less appropriate under the commerce clause.
63. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
64. Smithtown, 66 F.3d at 506. Smithtown financed construction of the incinerator
in conjunction with the Town of Huntington through an arrangement whereby bonds
issued by a state authority were secured by both towns' long-term obligation to pay a
service fee to the incinerator's operator, which then repaid the bonding authority.
Smithtown used funds collected from a property tax and tipping fees at the incinera-
tor to fund the service fee. Id. at 506 - 7.
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to deliver their trash to the incinerator.65 Smithtown enforced the
ordinance through fines and imprisonment.66 Second, the town
created improvement districts and solicited bids for collection serv-
ices in the districts.67 The bid winners had to sign a standard collec-
tion contract which required them to dispose of garbage at the
incinerator.68 Smithtown awarded contracts for collection in seven
of its districts to SSC.69 SSC, however, promptly violated its con-
tractual obligations by dumping Smithtown trash at sites which
charged tipping fees lower than those charged by Smithtown and
"pocketing the difference. '70 When Smithtown tried to enforce
both its ordinance and contracts, SSC filed suit claiming that both
violated the commerce clause.7'
The Second Circuit rejected Smithtown's defense that it was act-
ing as a market participant rather than a regulator when it enacted
its ordinance. 72 The court reasoned that government action "con-
stitutes 'market participation' only if a private entity could have
engaged in the same actions" and "[n]o private company in the
open market could force others to buy its services under pain of
criminal penalties. ' 73 The court went on to hold that the ordinance
was discriminatory because, like the ordinance in Carbone, it "di-
rects all town waste to a single local disposal facility, to the exclu-
sion of both in-state and out-of-state competitors. '74  Presumably,
in reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the fact that the
facility at issue was privately owned, since the court had allowed
Babylon's licensing regulation to stand even though it effectively
required disposal at a single, local public facility.
Smithtown's improvement districts and contractual arrange-
ments were another matter. Here, the court found that Smithtown
was acting as a market participant for essentially the same reasons
that applied in Babylon.75 After eliminating the collection market
65. Id. at 507. Smithtown's "flow control" ordinance provides: "No person au-
thorized to collect or transport acceptable waste within the Town of Smithtown except
as a solid waste management facility designated by the Town pursuant to this section."
Id. (citing Smithtown Code § 177-17(B) (1994)).
66. Id. Violation of the statute was an unclassified misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to 60 days. Id.
67. Id. at 507.
68. Id. at 507-8.
69. Id. at 508.
70. Smithtown, 66 F.3d at 508.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 511-13.
73. Id. at 512.
74. Id. at 514.
75. Id. at 515-16. See also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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by creating improvement districts, Smithtown allocated its tax dol-
lars to purchase collection services from SSC and purchased those
services on any terms it chose, including a requirement that SSC
dispose of waste at a preferred facility. 76 Smithtown's regulations
were therefore redundant, and the town was free to accomplish its
waste management goals entirely through districting and contracts.
IV. Issues Arising from the Second Circuit Decisions
The results in Babylon and Smithtown seem consistent with the
decision in Carbone, and the broad distinction in commerce clause
jurisprudence between regulations which favor local business inter-
ests and those which use public resources to even-handedly provide
a municipal service. Certainly, the Second Circuit's reasoning in
the two cases provides significant leeway for communities to imple-
ment waste management systems. At the very least, communities
which own their own disposal facilities, establish garbage districts,
and eschew regulation for service contracts are likely to be on safe
ground.
Many existing systems, however, are hybrids, incorporating some
but not all of the elements endorsed by the Second Circuit. For
example, Oneida and Herkimer counties have a joint system struc-
tured around county laws which require delivery of waste collected
in their seventy-eight constituent municipalities to facilities desig-
nated by the counties. At the county level, Oneida and Herkimer
have effectively created county-wide waste districts and have desig-
nated public facilities for disposal - favorable attributes under
Babylon and Smithtown. At the same time, however, the system is
largely financed by elevated tipping fees directly imposed on waste
haulers. Moreover, some of the constituent cities and towns collect
their own waste, some solicit bids and award a service contract to a
single hauler, and others allow residents to choose their own hauler
from those agreeing to deliver waste to the county facility and who
obtain a local operating license. How each of these systems within
the larger bi-county system will fare is difficult to predict. While
municipalities using licensing requirements to implement flow con-
trol may be more vulnerable to challenge than those relying on
self-hauling or an agent, municipalities allowing any licensed
hauler to operate have greater competition in their local markets.
That result is more consistent with the open-market principles un-
derlying the commerce clause than the situation in Babylon where,
76. Smithtown, 66 F.3d at 515-16.
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in the final analysis, a single local operator had cornered the
market.
With so many variables in the structure of waste management
systems, considerable uncertainty still exists regarding what consti-
tutes a permissible system. Indeed, despite the Second Circuit's
careful reasoning, some of that uncertainty may be attributed to
shortcomings in both the Babylon and Smithtown decisions. First,
the court's conclusion that Smithtown's incinerator was more like
Clarkstown's transfer station than Babylon's facility is arguable."
Smithtown's incinerator may have been owned and operated by a
private company, but it was constructed with public funds and its
operating costs were at least partly met by taxes; the rest of the
operating funds came from tipping fees which the court upheld as
constitutional under the town's districting scheme.78 If the critical
questions in these cases are: (i) who bears the cost of the system;
and (ii) whether the cost is allocated in a discriminatory manner,
then the fact that Smithtown's incinerator was "privately" owned is
hardly determinative.
Of course, if an equally critical question is "who profits?", there
can be no doubt that it is discriminatory for a municipality to use
its regulatory powers to award exclusive rights to a local processor
because it deprives out-of-state processors of the opportunity to
participate in the local market. This point is at the heart of the
Carbone decision. 79 The problem, however, is that while the Sec-
ond Circuit found that Smithtown's ordinance favored a single "lo-
cal" operator and it therefore "facially discriminate[s]" against
interstate commerce, the Smithtown facility was in fact operated by
an out-of-state corporation.80 Common sense suggests that
Smithtown's selection contributed to, rather than burdened, inter-
state commerce. Consequently, while it may be tempting to distin-
guish permissible and impermissible systems based on whether
they direct waste to "privately" or "publicly" owned facilities, the
line between the two is still ill-defined. Indeed, the Second Cir-
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. Smithtown, 66 F.3d at 505-6.
79. Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1683. Unfortunately, in Carbone this point was largely
hypothetical since there were no facts to suggest that any out-of-state processor was
interested in entering the Clarkstown market. The Supreme Court's apparent dis-
interest in the actual impact Clarkstown's system had on commerce may have en-
couraged courts to gloss over potentially complex factual questions concerning the
ultimate costs and burdens of this kind of public safety and environmental regulation.
80. See Smithtown, 66 F.3d 506 n.10. The incinerator was owned by Ogden Martin
Systems, a Delaware corporation largely based in New Jersey.
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cuit's failure to focus on the ownership of the Smithtown facility
suggests that the court may have concluded that a regulation that
benefits any single operator is impermissible, regardless of the ac-
tual impact it may have on commerce.
Finally, while the Second Circuit emphasized that Babylon and
Smithtown had relied on assessments, taxes or bonds for funding
rather than (as in Clarkstown) tipping fees collected by a private
operator,81 this distinction may be meaningless. Certainly, it is easy
to conclude from the use of locally-generated public revenues that
interstate commerce is not unduly burdened by a municipal system.
It is not necessarily true, however, that a system financed by regu-
latory measures which impose costs directly on generators and
haulers is any less equitable. Even in Carbone, while the Supreme
Court apparently objected to the fact that a private operator exclu-
sively benefited from the Clarkstown system,s there was no claim
that the system's costs were unevenly allocated between local gen-
erators or haulers and the out-of-state entities which chose to dis-
pose of waste in Clarkstown. After all, everyone paid the same
inflated tipping fee.83 Provided out-of-state entities are not sad-
dled with a disproportionate cost for doing business in a local waste
market, it is difficult to understand why funneling funding through
municipal coffers should make a difference.
V. Conclusion
The Second Circuit has gone a long way to focus the issues which
have been brewing since the Carbone decision. Certainly, its deci-
sion to uphold Babylon's waste management system and the dis-
tricting and contract aspects of Smithtown's system will provide
some comfort to those who believe that a return to largely unregu-
lated waste disposal invites environmental havoc. Unfortunately,
Babylon and Smithtown are unlikely to serve as the last word on
garbage for commerce clause purposes, and it is too soon to predict
what the last word might be.
81. See supra notes 37-41 and 64 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
